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The impact of globalisation 
on human rights
by Olusoji Elias
Olusoji Elias considers the latent inter-relationship between two of 
the most significant and challenging legal issues confronting human 
society today.
I t should probably not be much of a surprise that the concurrent, but discrete, phenomena of globalisation and human rights, as they may be considered as pervasive legal 
topics of some considerable priority, have in various ways and 
from different perspectives produced quite a burgeoning corral 
of legal and related literature, as any bibliographical catalogue 
inspection will confirm.
This article seeks to explore and explain the inter-relationship 
between these themes, in order to show how it is that 
intersections between them are primed, in a pluralistic context 
and attitude, to be of much significance in the shaping of their 
worthwhile development.
INTRODUCTION
Partly because both originate at the end of the last millennium 
there are many points at which they correspond and indeed are 
simultaneously interdependent. Both contend with localism, 
statehood, domestic jurisdiction and ideology, albeit in differing 
ways and at different levels. They profoundly enjoin and variably 
evolve cogent legal responses to normative extra-legal 
considerations from political, sociological, philosophical and 
other cultural contexts that feature prominently in each of their 
self-validating schemes of things. They are arguably at their most 
apparent within regional, or other international organisational 
spheres. They are perceived to entail different, perhaps 
equivocal, interpretations depending on the observer's 
standpoint   sometimes rather like the proverbial elephant and 
the six blind men. Both involve the question of how formally to 
surmount structural limitations which exist in the area ot 
justiciability. Each makes fundamental claims to attributes and 
attractions of dynamism, universalism and relativism and has a 
common 'post-modernist counterpart1   as well as a foe   in 
localism and local resistance (see Gunther Teubner (ed.), Global 
Law Without a State, Dartmouth, 1996, at p. xvii). Both are 
fraught with interpretive paradoxes deriving from questions of 
binarism and polarisation, but will each play an enormous role 
in the legal shape of things to be. They respectively involve 
multitudinous processes (both statal and non-statal), bear 
geographical burdens and have convergent high incidence areas,
such as civil society and economic activity. As Andrea Bianchi 
has argued in 'Globalization of Human Rights: The Role of 
Non-State Actors' (in Teubner (ed.,) above, at pp. 179 212), 
true universalisation of legal human rights norms at the global 
level may likely result as 'the germ of the process of globalisation 
of human rights law via the dynamics of a transnational civil 
society'. Globalisation and human rights law respectively 
manifest an openness of content and of texture.
Points of divergence arising from inherent differences of 
scopes of influence are rather more profound, and these bring 
forward a good few of the salient issues. Human rights and their 
coincident legal aspects perhaps represent one of the most 
significant features of the contemporary international legal 
order. The juxtapositive analysis with law-and-globalisation 
which this article presents should clearly indicate a gap between 
a much-formalised and maturing human rights law and an 
informal, and predominantly nascent, so-called 'global law'. The 
article's theme points to existing and foreseeable possibilities 
and assists in containing the discussion within the parameters 
required by the discipline of law. One might say that human 
rights law is itself global, in scope at least. However, it is of some 
interest that human rights are not necessarily always construed 
to be 'global issues' requiring 'global solutions' (cf. Overseas 
Development Institute, Briefing Paper 1999 (2) July, p. 1 (Box
0).
In Britain, the last bastion of unencoded individual rights 
which, paradoxically, led the post-second world war movement 
that produced the first human rights documents (the United 
Nations' Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) 1948 
and the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) 1950), 
a Human Rights Act which substantially looks to the latter is set
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to acquire the force of law. Whether and on what basis this may 
be ascribed to globalisation is an important question, not least 
because an affirmative response would refute the 
unidirectionalism (i.e. that the world order reflects the 
hegemony of the developed world) that is often characteristic of 
globalisation discourse, as well as mark the revalorisation of old 
battle lines in terms that those lines have either been radically 
redrawn post-cold war or are in modulation in response to new
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norms (e.g., the emergence of sub-categories of exceptionally 
relevant types of human right: the rights of women and children 
and those of indigenous populations; conflict management; 
development-related phenomena; trade liberalisation, the 
environment and global warming; peace; the resolution of 
disputes by alternative means) as may be the case.
It is a matter of fact that the ECHR has provided the basis for 
many human rights codes elsewhere, such as in the 
Commonwealth. Indeed, the convention was never intended to 
be local or country-specific. Franck rightly maintains that the 
diversity of human rights documents collectively permits (as a 
'large normative canon') 'all persons to assume shared 
responsibility for shaping the civil society in which they live and 
work' (in Fairness in International Law and Institutions, Clarendon,
1995. pp. 123-124).
One recent reminder of what one may call the globalisation of 
human rights is afforded by the Pinochet affair in the English legal 
system, where the writ of a local magistrate in Spain could have run 
as far as the House of Lords had the circumstances   concerning 
the removal of the medieval conception of absolute immunity for 
former heads of state in respect of international crimes   made it 
right for it to have done (cf. Frances Webber, 'The Pinochet Case: 
The Struggle for the Realisation of Human Rights', 26 Journal of 
Law and Society 523 (1999), especially at pp. 532-537).
In its widest conceptualisation, globalisation does not 
definitionally or exclusively address legal issues in human rights 
but expands to include them. Moreover, contrary to the 
inherent restrictions that are recognised to accompany the idea 
of 'global law' (cf. Bianchi, at p. 179), it is neither improperly 
ambitious nor an exercise in abstraction to refer in this context 
to the radical aspects of the themes of transnationalism and civil 
society. These themes have significantly accounted for the 
substantial progress in the development of international human 
rights law over the last 50 years or so, without attempting to 
suggest that there are clear or simple solutions for the taking.
If any truly consequential impact on human rights law is to be 
discerned to have originated from general or specific global 
processes properly so-called, then the notion and the role of 
civil society must be a primary focal point, especially as these 
processes intersect with central issues of information, in a 
general sense, and communications. First, the issues from 
nomenclature, being particularly mindful that elemental 
concern is with the way in which individual (or generic) human 
beings are treated by local state law, and how effectively legal 
internationalism deals with the treatment. In particular, the 
traditional legal division between matters relating to governance 
of the public and the private institutions is increasingly to be 
seen to fall within the role of civil society.
IMPACT OR INTERPENETRATION?
The main broad characteristics and attributes of globalisation 
deserve to be briefly rehearsed. It involves several processes. It 
is typified by dichotomies, by informality and by binarities 
between the local and the global. Professor William Twining 
states authoritatively ('Globalisation and Legal Theory: Some 
Local Implications' in MDA Freeman (ed.), Current Legal Problems
1996. Clarendon, 1996, at p. 6) that:
' ... in analysing the contemporary world, it is often not enough to 
Jbcus on the traditional cast of small actors: sovereign states, official
international organisations, and individuals ... The concept of legal 
personality, an old favourite in Austinian analytical jurisprudence, may 
be ripe for a revival in a global context.'
Professor Anthony Giddens describes globalisation as 'the 
intensification of worldwide social relations which link distant 
localities in such a way that local happenings are shaped by 
events occurring many miles away and vice versa' (The 
Consequences of Modernity, polity, 1990, at p. 64). The economist 
had traditionally associated globalisation purely with 
crossborder economic and financial markets, so that, for 
example, it is inevitable to enquire, as Chinkin does, as to 
whether 'economic globalization make[s] concentration upon 
states' obligations worthless [in a horizontally structured 
international legal system]?' ('International Law and Human 
Rights' in Tony Evans (ed.) Human Rights Fifty Years On: A 
Reappraisal, Manchester, 1998, at p. 120).
ULTIMATE GOAL
Today, there is an extensive diversification of issues that are 
brought under the umbrella of human rights, and 'human 
rights' themselves have commendablv evolved from their
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primarily political origins as first generation human rights to 
being fully-fledged creatures of the law...They are enforceable 
in the courts, they attract sanctions in the event of breach, they 
are the subject of concerted efforts to make them more 
articulate. The ultimate goal is human accountability in the face
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of expansionist developments and trends, new issues and 
connections which predominantly centre, as they should, on 
people and governance.
In much the same vein of 'the possibility of delivering 
economic and social rights within the prevailing liberal 
economic structure' (in 'International financial institutions and 
social and economic rights: an exploration', in Evans, op. cit., at 
p. 161), Thomas observes, as part of her description of 
globalisation as 'the process whereby power is located in global 
social formations and expressed through global networks rather 
than through territorially based states' (p. 162), that:
'[t]/ie process cf globalization is rendering it impossible for many 
states to exercise a basic minimum control over the domestic economy, 
and therefore it is directly undermining the state's ability to deliver 
social and economic rights to citizens', (at p. 163, citing J 
Mittelman (ed.), Globalization: Critical Reflections, Rienner, 
1995.)
She concludes that:
'resistance to the orthodoxy increases across the globe, as social 
movements arise to protest against the universalization of essentially 
western values of economic and political liberalism and accompanying 
western conceptions of human rights.' (p. 183)
People are clearly now to be seen at the centre of the 
globalisation of good governance, especially when it is convened 
to form what is loosely known as civil society, hence the 
assertion 'the emergence of global civil society.' This is not to 
overrate the notional value of 'civil society', fraught as it is with 
considerations of its being hegemonistic, for example. Rather, it 
becomes reasonable to anticipate the expansion of economic 
and social rights from their relatively better-exercised civil and 
political counterparts.
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The Commission on Global Governance begins its report (Our 
Global Neighbourhood, OUFJ 1995, at p. 1) with the observation 
that:
'[t]/?e collective power of people to shape the future is greater now 
than before, and the need to exercise it is more compelling'.
It goes on to assert (at p. 62) that:
'[t]/ie emergence of a global civil society is an important precondition 
of democracy at the global level, although it cannot guarantee it'.
(See also, e.g., the Report of the UN Secretary-General on the 
Work of the Organisation, A/48/1, 10.9.93, at p. 5.) The 
Commission firmly places human rights within the framework of 
global security (at p. 79) and recognises the potential for enhancing 
universally human rights via trade-restricting measures (at p. 170).
But what may accurately and usefully be made of the 
foregoing for the present purpose, beyond holding that all 
aspects of human life with which human rights discourse would 
run are in one way or another subject or to be subject to 
globalisation? Globalisation is ostensibly asymmetrical, and is 
subject to geographical and other circumstantial limits and 
burdens. Of itself, it does not have aims but, rather, is to be seen 
as ineluctable (cf. Batou, 'Is Globalisation Ineluctable?'1 , (an 
unpublished conference paper, 1999). It is to be appraised from 
its tangible consequences. It thrives outside state sovereignty but 
its formalism, if any, depends on the mutuality of its non-state 
agents' interaction with statehood. Inevitably, it poses possibly 
more questions than it provides practical solutions to peoples' 
problems. It is not directly concerned with development, 
however described, in relation to human rights. But it must deal7 O
with the issues in a pluralistic context.
With an eye to the developing world, it has to be said that the 
informalistic character of the notion of 'global law' has much too
commend it (see, e.g., O Elias, 'Globalization, 'Law and 
Development', and Contemporary Africa'1 [2000] EJLR). As part of the 
global process, the cultivation of a truly responsive civil society 
would directly respond to the development-based requirements 
of material development, to humanisation, and other firm cultural 
foundations necessary at the local level, without underestimating 
cultural diversity and differentiation in national, international and 
global contexts. In fact, it is the task of producing worthy local 
norms, which adequately reflect and substantiate internationally- 
derived human rights codes' versions of these norms, that 
hallmarks any real impact from cultural globalisation on the law 
on human rights. Local norms at issue must include, for example, 
the prioritisation of the civil entitlements of women, those 
deriving from religion, from multiparty democracy, all of which 
are necessary preconditions of good governance.
Banda provides an important analysis in 'Global Standards: 
Local Values' (1999 2000, forthcoming). In the illuminating
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context of how the issue of global standards and local values is 
mediated using the customary family law of patrilineal societies 
in Africa, she argues that:
' ... given the highly contested nature of the legitimacy of global 
standards at the local level and indeed the multifaceted nature of "local 
values", mediating the two will not be an easy task ... [\\ndeed the power 
differentials between men and women, elders and younger people, ethnicities, 
religious groupings, make it clear that getting a coherent set of values with 
which to test global standards is in itself one of the main challenges.'
The North-South divide presents perhaps the most 
consequential benchmark as to impact if one is to avoid a 
monocular or territorially-narrow view of the global process (cf. 
Judge Rosalyn Higgins, Problems and Process: International Law and 
How We Use /^Clarendon, 1994, pp. 96-97)). Multiplicities and 
complexities strengthen the argument for pluralism, over and 
above binarism, if civil society is to be truly global and effective.
A more forceful advocate of the pro-globalisation ethic could 
argue that 'global law' is in reality more than a latent complement 
to formal (international human rights) law, that it is a living sub- 
phenomenon and not merely an amorphous contingent 
alternative, and that it indubitably has its own Dworkinian legal
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integrity founded in a quite divergent pluralist context. To be clear, 
R A Wilson is of the view that the human rights movement is to be 
seen as 'one of the most globalised political values of our time' (in 
the introduction to his (ed.) Human Rights, Culture and Context: 
Anthropological Perspectives, Pluto, 1996, p. 1), replacing the 
communist/capitalist ideologies of the cold-war era and embracing 
the programmatic universalism of UDHR principles.
From its inception in the post-second world war years, the 
development of human rights law up to the present reveals a 
natural and persistent dynamism that has made answerable, or 
has at least credibly sought to make so, the problems that have 
provoked humanist counteraction. The UDHR itself was 
brought into being as a direct result of the atrocities ol that war. 
Today, there is an extensive diversification of issues that are 
brought under the umbrella of human rights, and 'human rights' 
themselves have commendably evolved from their primarily 
political origins as first generation human rights to being fully- 
fledged creatures of the law (cf. art. 22, African Charter, on the 
'legal' right to development). They are enforceable in the courts, 
they attract sanctions in the event of breach, they are the subject 
of concerted efforts to make them more articulate. The ultimate 
goal is human accountability in the face of expansionist 
developments and trends, new issues and connections which 
predominantly centre, as they should, on people and governance.
PRACTICAL ISSUES
questions of actual enforcement and procedural 
methodology, rather than those of standard-setting for 
example, are today's real practical issues.
Unavoidably, the questions which must be asked include 
whether globalisation, literally or technically, has impacted on 
human rights law, whether human rights themselves likewise 
affect the global process, and whether the reality is that we are 
in fact concerned with disparate streams in a much broader 
scenario in which there are many other factors deserving to be 
taken on board   such as the reduction of the gap or friction 
between state and interpersonal spheres of activity in which 
these issues also necessarily feature (for example, in the context 
of the recognition of legal liability or responsibility of non-state 
actors). W H Reinicke writes of an emerging global public policy 
(Global Public Policy, Brookings Institution 1998), in which 
individual rights and entitlements form one of several focal 
points. The net effect is that the relationship between human 
rights and globalisation is best appraised from observable 
consequences. Human rights have undoubtedly been promoted 
to, and proliferated, at the global level at which the idea of truly
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worldwide civil society is not remotely unreal; rather, it is more 
a conflict as to which right is at issue and at whose behest. 
Higgins's articulation of this issue, particularly as to 
proliferation, is characteristically sophisticated:
'Thus it is that we now have an unprecedented ratification ratejbr a 
treaty on the rights of the child, whereas a decade ago there would have 
been serious doubt that there was any such human right. In principle, 
therefore, the list could be infinite. In practice, the continued expansion 
of the list of rights presents problems. If states accede to this expansion 
for reasons of convenience, rather than conviction, then the coinage will 
undoubtedly become debased, and the major operational importance of 
designating a right a human right   that opprobrium attaches to 
ignoring it   will be lost ...
The prime task is necessarily the identification and articulation cf the 
right.' (op. cit., p. 105)
(On the issue of ratification in African countries, see F Banda 
'Meaningless Gestures? African Countries and the Convention 
on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women' in J Eekelaar and T Nhlapo (eds.), The Changing Family, 
Hart, 1999, 529ff.).
It is of course true that regionalist and other theme-based 
discourse bears out a certain truism: that there is usually a 
prototype, matrix or blueprint from one region (typically 
Europe) to be adapted or otherwise emulated there or 
elsewhere, as witness the various regional human rightso o
structures. Likewise, it cannot seriously be countermanded that 
human rights and global processes share a common horizon, 
namely the improvement (not at all necessarily the 
uniformisation) of the quality of human life everywhere. But the 
consistent leveller is that revalorising the local often requires a 
deliberate normativisation, a process of transformation or 
relinquishment of what has come before, that it is not merely a 
matter of global harmonisation for its own sake. To say that 
there are huge enigmas of compatibility is to underscore the 
nature of the beast in these respects. So it is that questions of 
actual enforcement and procedural methodology, rather than 
those of standard-setting for example, are today's real practical 
issues. And globalism plays an important part in terms of both 
the necessity for humanist response in the first place and the 
means by which that response is to be made to count, be it in 
the form of rights' definition, of evidential fact-finding and 
substantiation, or of ideological institutionalisation. States and 
civil society, tritely, must consciously collaborate in a pluralist 
way that re-addresses their respective attitudes in the face of 
shared humanistic ideals. To provisionally conclude, as Chinkin 
does (loc. cit, at pp. 121-122):
"... the capability of the international legal system to be relevant to 
human rights requires dislodging legal and conceptual boundaries 
between, for example, human rights law and international economic 
law, between international humanitarian law and military necessity, 
between law and non-law and between states and non-state actors. The 
understanding cf rights must be more relevant to those whose interests 
are largely excluded from its scope and to those non-state actors that 
remain outside its formal constraints. This requires a continual process 
of redefinition of the traditional scope cf human rights law that goes 
beyond inequality, or even specific issues such as racial, gendered or 
ethnic violence. It also requires rethinking the primary role of the state 
in guaranteeing human rights in light of global forces that limit its 
freedom oj internal choice. These phenomena must be analysed in their
entirety to reveal the multiplicity of disadvantage and addressed in their 
wider political, economic and social contexts. Non-compulsory legal 
regulation cannot achieve such fundamental restructuring of power but 
it nevertheless has its role in the process.'
ADVANCEMENT AND PARADOX
It must go without saying that there is a highly ramified 
interrelatedness between globalisation and human rights, if not 
necessarily between globalisation and human rights law. This 
preferable view accommodates the proposition that the former 
unavoidably impacts upon the latter at the general level. But the 
heterogeneity of the respective streams makes it either less facile 
or simply myopic to hold that the field of consideration is served 
well enough bv looking at the effects of the former upon theo j o r
latter, rather than in both directions. Indeed, to ascribe 'impact' 
literally to human rights discourse would be concerned with 
tangible ephemera and not with the underlying complex 
processes and solutions involved. State sovereignty, we are 
convincingly told (see N MacCormick, ''Beyond the Sovereign State' 
56 MLR 1 (1993)), is much eroded, be this consequent upon 
the global process (relative irrelevance of physical boundaries; 
human and cultural transmigration; multinational corporate 
activity) or on other (related) factors like regionalism. There is 
much that is ambiguous and uncertain (cf. K Mills, Human Rights 
in the Emerging Global Order: A New Sovereignty?, MacMillan, 1998, 
e.g. at p. 53).
A most fundamental issue concerns what is to replace eroded 
states. Will the scope of humanitarian intervention, for 
example, become an obligated response rather than one that 
turns on power? The intersection between globalisation and 
human rights triggers a good deal more and, more importantly 
perhaps, necessitates an enlargement of the lawyer's usual 
human rights discipline as, doubtless, the upcoming applications 
of the UK's Human Rights Act may reveal. Evolution of further 
concomitant legal rights are not to be ruled out, especially at the 
national or local level, possibly outwith the liberating 
undertones of public-sphere human rights law   as witness the 
debate surrounding the traditional dichotomy between public 
legal rights and those sourced in private law (see the Rt Hon Sir 
Richard Buxton, 'The Human Rights Act and Private Law', 116 
LQR 48 (2000), especially at p. 59: The Act ... may have a 
more tangential effect on private law litigation ...').
Human rights law   as customary international law 
concerned with the rule of law, with sociological jurisprudence 
and with civil society   is indeed global law. All that could be 
given to differentiate them is the issue of how narrowly one 
construes law as a valid and effective phenomenon. Somewhat 
paradoxical though it may seem, it is to human rights law that a 
foreign investor must look for the protection of its rights, for 
example, to just compensation (cf. the Fourth, Fifth, Seventh 
and Fourteenth Amendments to the US Constitution; see the 
Supreme Court decision in Lynch v Hounslow Finance Corporation 
405 US 538 (1972), especially at p. 552: 'a fundamental 
interdependence exists between the personal right to liberty and 
the personal right to property. Neither could have meaning 
without the other'). Paradoxically, there is cause for surprise 
that a human right to property has not attracted much 
consideration in international law; it does not feature in either 
the International Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights or in the International Convention on Civil and Political
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Rights (cf. Lithgow v UK 102 ECHR (Ser. A) 8 EHRR 329 
(1980)). Furthermore, as Franck points out:
'the increase in individuals' human rights is inevitably accompanied 
by an increase in their responsibility jbr human wrongs, even when 
committed under the colour of state.' (op. cit., at p. 264)
And this is to be construed in the context of the symbiosis 
subsisting between human rights and globalism.
At a different level, relating to concepts and jurisprudential 
distinctions, one writer has observed that:
'[distinguishing development law questions jrom private 
international law questions may not be easy, since implications of both 
may be present in any given fact scenario'. (R Sarkar, Development 
Law and International Finance, Kluwer, 1998, at p. 50)
He illustrates thus (at p. 51):
'whether women should have the right to the legal custody of their 
children following a separation from the marital domicile may pose a 
family law issue under domestic law, or an international human rights 
question, or, if legal reform of existing family law is contemplated in 
order to change the legal status of women, a development law question.'
Indeed, he finds that the effects of economic globalisation are 
themselves undiscriminatingly global, albeit in often radically 
different ways. Kellner had shown that cultural homogenisation, 
the bane of neo-Marxists, traditionalists, multiculturists, and 
environmental protectionists, was a significant factor in these 
regards (Globalization and the Postmodern Turn, at p. 2). Inevitably, 
law is a medium, having enormous potential, within reason, for 
the expression of the diversified culture of today.
CONCLUSION
Legal human rights depend, first and foremost, on an 
empowered legal process: courts' diligence; claimants' access to 
justice, to information and evidence; a compliant general 
attitude. It is fairly obvious that the contemporary conventional 
nature of human rights discourse, by which the dynamics 
thereof are emphasised, provides a natural template for making 
the most of the symbiosis with the (more) powerful forces of 
globalisation. Precisely how this is to be achieved is neither a 
matter for conjecture nor a forgiving exercise as the complexity 
and diversity of the issues involved have shown. And statehood 
is here to stay. The role of civil society and communication in 
bringing about desirable improvements has not gone 
unremarked, while the ever-increasing incidence of
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transnationalism has been a frequent over-riding factor. 
Whatever the observer's standpoint as to human rights and 
globalisation, a result-oriented attitude is required in order 
necessarily to avoid retarding the course of things. Solutions to 
the problems of the one are replete in the mechanisms of the 
other, and these solutions necessarily are more important. @
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